Introduction
The debate about 'democratic peace' -the phenomenon that democracies never, or very rarely, go to war with one another -has been fully joined for over a decade now. Two questions have driven it: (1) is it really true that something about democratic government prevents or inhibits warfare with other democracies; and (2) assuming that democratic peace is real, how exactly do we account for the phenomenon? While the discussion of these issues has usually centered on modern states of the last two centuries or so, some studies have extended their inquiries assembling to decide the issues of the day themselves rather than leaving all governing to elected representatives. The ancients also practiced slavery and excluded women from having a share in government. While these and other factors are important to keep in mind -and will be revisited later in this article in regard to their potential impact on democratic peace -they need not dissuade anyone from observing the tendencies of the Greek examples. This is because the fundamental kinship of ancient and modern democracy is obvious when one considers the shared principles visibly at work in both. These include the notion that government is to be in the hands of the many rather than the few or the one; veneration of the ideals of freedom and equality among citizens; and inclusion within the political body of the broadest categories of residents plausible given the social realities of the era. Such characteristics unite democracies ancient and modern and distinguish them clearly from the perennial alternatives (oligarchy, autocracy, theocracy, etc.). Even the divergences noted earlier are not as drastic as might be thought: ancient democratic governments often employed councils of elected or allotted citizens, so the principle of representation was far from alien; and many modern democracies exhibit a taste for direct citizen action, as the increasing use of ballot initiatives and referenda shows. Further, slavery and the political exclusion of women were not features of demokratia per se, but of Greek civilization as a whole, and indeed of most civilizations until very recent times. If one refuses the name democracy to any state that tolerated slavery or limited participation on the basis of gender, one eliminates from historical consideration almost all popular governments prior to the very latest versionsand even many of these, if continuously evolving views of social justice are to be the criteria, might well be eliminated on one ground or another. In sum, when viewed strictly as a political order and considered in the light of contemporary alternatives, demokratia's essential similarity to modern democracy is inescapable, justifying the willingness of scholars of democratic peace to reflect on what might be learned from Greek events. 1 The first question that must be addressed, then, is whether the pattern noted in modern history that democratic states tend not to go to war -touted by some as coming 'as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations'2 -is equally demonstrable in the ancient world. Some have claimed that the most absolute formulation of the pattern, that true democracies have never fought each other, applies to the ancient world just as it does the modern. Spencer Weart (1998) maintains as much in his book NeverAt War, which examines the phenomenon in all eras of history and devotes a crucial early chapter to ancient Greece.3 Other proponents of democratic peace have been more cautious, though they too find support for the hypothesis in ancient evidence. Bruce Russett, who has been at the center of the democratic peace debate for years, closely examined the behavior of ancient Greek states in his article, coauthored by William Antholis, 'Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence 1 This issue, of course, will bear discussion at far greater length than the present occasion allows. For detailed treatments of the ideals and definition of ancient democracy (demokratia), with comparisons to modern versions, see Robinson (1997: chs 1 and 2), Hansen (1989 Hansen ( , 1996 , Ostwald (1996) , and Murray (1995) . 2 This oft-quoted phrase comes from Levy (1988: 662) . While statistical analyses do show a low incidence of warfare between modern democracies, not everyone agrees that popular government itself is the cause. See the prominent critiques of Layne (1994) To what extent is either of these, the two most important assessments to date on ancient democratic peace,4 accurate? Both are scrutinized here from the perspective of an ancient historian not committed to any side in the larger debate. The present analysis reveals that the attempt to discover an ancient democratic peace which matches the modern phenomenon leads to serious problems in the way the ancient evidence is handled and construed. While the testimony from Classical Greece may yet prove to be quite valuable on this issue, its proper interpretation points in a rather different direction from the path taken by the above authors.
A final preliminary note: skeptics might point out that despite the fact political relations in Greco-Roman antiquity have been studied intensively for more centuries than most other academic disciplines have even existed, no classical historian (ancient or modern) has argued for the idea that unusual peace held sway between ancient democracies.5 But one may fairly counter that this is 4 Other detailed treatments of the ancient evidence for democratic peace are rare. Bachteler (1997) adds little new analysis of the ancient evidence, seeking rather to modify Russett's approach and conclusions with more of a 'social constructivist' view. Despite its title, Raymond (1996) has nothing to do with the ancient world. 5 Indeed, one tends to find quite the opposite. Finley (1979:63) , for example, says the following regarding a brief period of relative peace in mid-fifth-century Sicily: 'That this was the result not of a deep-rooted pacific attitude inherent in the new democracies but rather of a temporary and unavoidable concentration on internal affairs was eventually to become apparent'. Finley goes on to describe the renewal of warfare among the mostly democratic Greek cities in Sicily in the following pages (see discussion below).
an entirely new line of inquiry, and that only in the last decade or so have numerous political scientists and historians become interested in democratic peace. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true that by asking new kinds of questions one can make new discoveries, even in a field as venerable as ancient history. So for the present analysis, we will consider irrelevant the absence of prior scholarly notice of an ancient democratic peace.
The Weart Hypothesis
Weart (1998: 13) claims to find 'not a single unambiguous case of Greek democracies warring on one another', which finding nicely fits his general conclusion of nearcomplete democratic peace throughout history. In so contending, he adds a few caveats. First, for a democracy to be counted as such he insists that it have been (and been perceived by outsiders to be) so for at least three years, and thus have been 'well established'. Wars are also carefully defined: no conflict resulting in fewer than 200 deaths in combat will count, in order to eliminate trivial confrontations from consideration (Weart, 1998: 17-20, 24-34) .
At first glance, these limitations seem fair enough. Regarding the three-year rule, since some theorists of democratic peace have held that democracies act pacifically toward each other because of, among other factors, the 'democratic training' their leaders receive as they maneuver themselves into power and the perception within one state that the other is in fact a democracy 'like them', it seems reasonable that one exclude from consideration those conflicts that emerge before a 'democratic culture' has had time to become fully established in both potential disputants. However, this is a significant exception to make - Only one scholar ever possessed the documents needed to study the constitution of Syracuse: Aristotle. He carefully avoided calling Syracuse as it existed in 415 a democracy. Rather, he styled it a 'polity', by which he probably meant a mixed regime -one with superficially democratic elections, but with an oligarchic elite hanging onto effective control. Only after the Athenians were defeated was the constitution revised so that democratic leaders were fully in power. (Weart, 1998 : 33, with footnotes) Several inaccuracies leap out at one here. First, Thucydides never, implicitly or explicitly, makes a point of warning that democracies should not go to war against one other. One may reasonably argue that Thucydides exaggerates for rhetorical effect now and again in his history, or that in the books on Sicilian affairs he highlights the arrogance and incompetence with which the Athenian democracy pursued the war and emphasizes the foolishness of demagogues (both Athenian and Syracusan); but in no way do such authorial tendencies add up to 'warning against wars between democracies'.10 Second, it is most dubious to claim that Aristotle was in a better position to know the political institutions of late fifth-century Syracuse than Thucydides, who was alive then, was active in and a keen observer of political affairs, and whose historical writings demonstrate substantial knowledge about Sicily in particular. 11 Did Aristotle, a philosopher from Stagira who lived in the middle of the following century, uniquely possess 'the documents needed to study the constitution of Syracuse'? We have no evidence on which to base such a claim. All we know is that Aristotle or his students wrote about the govern- This testimony, all of which is valuable in some degree, nevertheless does not have quite the force Russett & Antholis imply. For one thing, in moving quickly through this material the two scholars fail to point out to their readers the prejudicial context or controversial nature of much of it. The Isocrates passage, for example, is part of a highly charged patriotic oration written over half a century after the demise of the Athenian empire and has as one of its primary purposes to praise to the sky past Athenian services to Greece. Therefore one simply cannot take at face value its inherently dubious claims about how pleased Athens' subject states used to be to surrender their tribute money or that they did so to protect their democracies against the fearsome cruelties of Athens' opponents (Isocrates 12.66-68; Zucker, 1954: esp. 11-12). As for Diodotus, his speech comes to us in Thucydides' history as part of a famous debate about what to do with the Mytileneans after the defeat of their revolt from the Athenian empire in 427 BC. Diodotus' claim that the demos (a term misleadingly rendered as 'democracy' in the translation used by Russett & Antholis) in every city favors Athens is an integral part of an argument for mercy for the Mytileneans: their demos, he asserts, never really backed the revolt. This assertion is questionable, as Thucydides' own narrative of the course of the rebellion does not demonstrate it (Thucydides 3.2-50, esp. 28-29, 47; Westlake, 1976). Even more questionable is the larger rhetorical claim: by expressing as a general proposition the (ultimately unprovable) notion that the demos everywhere favors Athens, Diodotus seeks to lend believability to his contention that the Mytilenean people acted similarly and thus deserve mercy. In fact, the 'popularity' of the Athenian empire is highly controversial and the subject of much scholarly skepticism and debate, for there is strong evidence of democracies avoid going to war with each other. They need not even indicate a general pattern of ideological bonding between democratic groups, for there were notable exceptions even as concerns Athens: PseudoXenophon himself mentions two or three instances in which Athens backed aristocratic groups over popular ones.27 As for the rest of Greece, we have no general statements that democratic groups tended to help each other, and there are prominent examples to the contrary, such as when democratic Syracuse intervened in Leontini c. 423 on behalf of the upper classes (hoi dunatoi) to drive out the demos (Thucydides 5.4.1-3). Nor did the demos always turn to democracies for help, or get help when they did. Consider Thucydides' narration of the disputes in Epidamnus, Corcyra, and Corinth which set Greece in motion toward the Peloponnesian war. The troubles began when the demos of Epidamnus, which was being hard-pressed by recently exiled elites (hoi dunatoi), made an appeal for help to its mother-city, democratic Corcyra. The colony/mother-city relationship explains the targeting of this appeal, not shared political ideals, for when the Corcyran democracy refused to help, preferring to side with the elites -an act worth noting in itself -the desperate Epidamnians next turned not to some other democracy, but to oligarchic Corinth, which was a secondary mother-city to Epidamnus. As it happens, Corinth agreed to help the demos, which was followed by democratic Corcyra going to war against the demos of Epidamnus. Any tendency toward democratic peace or even democratic support for populist groups is hard to discover here. Indeed, such constitutional considerations are entirely absent from Thucydides' discussion, Cordano, 1992; Manganaro, 1995) . Regarding Acragas, Diodorus mentions in passing psephismata (decrees from a popular vote) as well as one tumultuous wartime assembly meeting; in this connection, one might mention the archaeological discovery of an apparent ekklesiasterion, or meeting place for the ruling assembly of the city. This structure is, however, dated to the third century BC (Diodorus 13.84.5, 13.87-88; de Miro, 1967: 164-168). We also have stories about the philosopher Empedocles of Acragas. Active in the mid-fifth century, Empedocles seems to have behaved at times like the archetypal demagogue, thundering persuasively in the law courts and other forums about the dangers of would-be tyrants and about the necessity of political equality, all of which imply the existence of a potent demos.32
In sum, while the source material is too thin to confirm with certainty Diodorus' democratic labeling beyond the case of Syracuse, available evidence does lend support to the contention. We are left, then, with several more military conflicts between probable democracies in Sicily during the second half of the fifth century.
Conclusion
This investigation has found much to question about the viability in the ancient world of the modern conception of democratic peace. Weart's attempt to argue that wars between Greek democracies never occurred is simply wrong, miscarrying most glaringly in the case ofAthens' campaign against Syracuse from 415-413 BC. Russett & Antholis approach the subject more realistically and end up concluding merely that the ancient evidence suggests nascent and insufficiently effective norms of interdemocratic nonviolence. And yet even this conclusion seems too optimistic: the authors' own quantitative data of Peloponnesian war-era conflicts shows, if anything, that ancient democracies were more likely to war with each other than other governments; and the non-quantitative testimony does little more than illustrate occasional cooperation between democracies and/or struggling democratic groups in the context of Athenian imperial ambitions. Wars among probable democracies in fifthcentury Sicily further weaken the proposition.
Nevertheless, theorists of democratic peace may still find the ancient evidence useful for their investigations. The lack of a discernible propensity for democratic peace in ancient Greece does not mean that the phenomenon is unreal in the modern world.33 Perhaps future work might focus precisely on the differences of setting and institutions between ancient and modern democracies in an attempt to explain why the pattern occurs in one era and not the other. Russett & Antholis make a start of it when they speculate about the role of institutions versus perceptions in trying to explain their unexpected results, but they are handicapped by their insistence that one can find clear 33 On the other hand, those who doubt the existence of democratic peace will no doubt take this study as further grounds for skepticism. signs of democratic peace in the ancient evidence (Russett & Antholis, 1993: 59-62; similarly, Bachteler, 1997) . It may be that the differences in ancient and modern practice referred to at the beginning of this article play a significant role here. Could something about the small size of Greekpoleis, with their citizens' fierce parochial loyalty to city-state rather than to larger political ideals, prevent the operation of democratic peace? Differing social and economic realities within and among cities -e.g. slavery, ancient tradealso provide potential avenues of explanation. Or perhaps the real key lies in the institutions of ancient democracy itself: as noted above, demokratia meant that citizens generally governed themselves directly, through meetings of the popular assemblies to which all were invited and by election or random allotment of ordinary people to carry out government functions. Terms of office were short (typically one year), and authority was strictly limited. Perhaps modern representative democracy with its entrusting of power to an elective, careerist elite enhances the prospect of peace between such states.
Scholars have variously championed such factors as institutional restraints, cultural norms, shared competitive experiences, perceptions of outsiders, and trading connections as providing the main impetus towards democratic peace. Future study of the contrasting way the Greeks dealt with these categories of group behavior may go a long way to resolving what it is that generally prompts -or retards -peace between democracies.
